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from Washington to Bush (Yale U. Press 2008). Pp. 558. $60.00.
Our constitutional law regarding the separation of powers is quite indeterminate,
leaving much scope for the free play of politics and the evolution of institutions. Hence,
it is probably beneficial that the Supreme Court has injected itself into interbranch
controversies only episodically. Nevertheless, lawyers and scholars often succumb to the
temptation to convert their policy preferences into constitutional arguments because a
doctrine that gains constitutional status trumps ordinary politics. This impulse can be
quite sincere - it is easy to treat the Delphic text of the Constitution as a mirror reflecting
one's own values. A consequence is the generation of "law office history," the bending
of constitutional history to fit the advocate's desired outcome.1 I write to review three
books that typify this practice and its drawbacks, and one that reveals the advantages of
an approach that hews more closely to the historical evidence.
All four books analyze presidential power, and all four confront a basic dilemma
that has persisted from the framing of the Constitution to today. The problem is that the
framers, lacking any experience with a republican chief executive, wrote a very sketchy
and incomplete description of the powers of the presidency into Article II of the
Constitution. Interpreters soon began trying to fill in the blanks. Their arguments fell into
two broad camps. Friends of a powerful executive followed the lead of Alexander
Hamilton, who asserted that the phrase vesting the "executive power" in the President
constituted a substantive grant of all powers that could be styled executive in nature. The
competing arguments of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson concluded that
presidential actions should rest on more explicit constitutional or statutory authority than
the Vesting Clause.

* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder
1. Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,95 Colum. L. Rev. 523, 554
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Today, the fiercest Hamiltonians argue for very broad executive power to act
unilaterally, either without seeking statutory authority or even in contravention of
statutory command.2 The fiercest Madisonians are unwilling to recognize broad
"inherent" presidential powers; therefore, they argue that the President must generally
rest content with authority that the Constitution grants explicitly or that Congress
chooses to confer by statute.3 There is also a group of "pluralist" scholars in the middle
(including me), who say "it depends." 4 Pluralists tend to support presidential power to
take initiatives not authorized by statute, but would recognize the legitimacy of statutory
override. 5
The first book to be considered here is a fine history that makes a contribution
without outrunning the facts. In Thomas Jefferson and Executive Power,6 Jeremy Bailey
successfully embarks on a quite interesting and original project. He wants to save the
reputation of Thomas Jefferson from a charge of inconsistency that dates from the work
of Henry Adams. The charge is well known: that Jefferson held a Madisonian theoretic
view of a weak and limited presidency, but abandoned his principles in practice in favor
of a vigorous exercise of the office. Bailey examines Jefferson's statements and actions
over an extended period beginning with the Revolutionary War and finds that Jefferson
developed an original and consistent view of the nature of executive power.
Bailey argues persuasively that what mattered to Jefferson was that the executive
be both strong and tied to the support of the people, whose will he embodied in office.
As Bailey points out, this overall stance was an important bridge from the elite
presidency of the Federalists to the more democratic one from Jackson to the present.
Jefferson's subtle mind fleshed out this general goal in an interesting way. He thought
that the explicit constitutional powers of the President should indeed be narrowly
construed, in part so that the people could understand them easily. No Hamiltonian
building of castles on the Vesting Clause for him. Yet on great occasions, the President
could invoke a principle of executive prerogative that traced from the work of John
Locke. This prerogative theory was that sometimes the President might need to act
outside the law, or even contrary to it. In that case, to give legitimacy to his actions, the
President must appeal to the legislature and the people to ratify the actions taken. The
advantage this formulation provided for Jefferson was that the powers of the executive
were usually limited, but could expand temporarily as needed.
To some extent, Bailey overstates his case - or perhaps I should say that Jefferson

2. See e.g. John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitutionand Foreign Affairs after 9/11 (U.
Chi. Press 2005).
3. For a thoughtful approach, see the work of Louis Fisher, for example, The Constitution and 9/11:
Recurring Threats to America's Freedoms (U. Press Kan. 2008); Constitutional Conflicts between Congress
and the President (5th rev. ed., U. Press Kan. 2007). See also David Gray Adler et al., The Constitutionand the
Conduct ofAmerican ForeignPolicy (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., U. Press Kan. 1996).
4. See generally Harold H. Bruff, Balance of Forces: Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative
State (Carolina Academic Press 2006); Peter M. Shane, Madison 's Nightmare: How Executive Power
Threatens American Democracy (U. Chi. Press 2009); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The
Presidentin Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696 (2007); Peter L. Strauss, The PlaceofAgencies in
Government: Separation ofPowers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984).
5. See generally Harold H. Bruff, Bad Advice: Bush's Lawyers in the War on Terror 84-111 (U. Kan.
Press 2009).
6. Jeremy D. Bailey, Thomas Jefferson and Executive Power (Cambridge U. Press 2007).
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overstated his. For it remains true that Jefferson's words could point one way while his
actions pointed another. This was true in his responses to the Barbary pirates, when he
quite disingenuously explained himself to Congress. It was also true in his enforcement
of the Embargo Act of 1807, when his very vigorous executive actions outran his more
limited general conception of the office. Bailey, focusing on Jefferson's various
rhetorical appeals to the people, somewhat slights the facts of both episodes. But this is a
minor sin for Bailey, whether or not it was for Jefferson. What this great President most
drew back from - just as he instinctively drew back from open controversy was the
question of whether his theory was more Hamiltonian than he could ever bring himself to
admit. The best example is Louisiana, when he suppressed his own constitutional doubts
about power, avoided any Hamiltonian arguments that could set bad general precedents,
and fell back on Lockean prerogative.
Whether Jefferson liked it or not, though, the Louisiana precedent stands as an
exercise of broad executive power that has been invoked ever since by Hamiltonians.
Jefferson wanted to preserve both his Purchase and his principles. His defense of
Louisiana attempted to place his own faith in the Constitution - his own particular theory
of executive power that embodied his political values. It should never surprise us that
presidents would try to do that. The great ones succeed, at least to some extent.
Jefferson's theory about his powers remains part of our dialogue about the office. Bailey
has very helpfully brought this theory to new and clarified prominence.
Scholars who try to place their own faith in the Constitution, as opposed to
describing how presidents have done so, can only gaze at Jefferson in envy as they try to
convince us that what they wish were true has always been so. Two recent books from
scholars at opposite ends of the political spectrum have advanced their competing visions
of the executive. John Yoo's Crisisand Command: The History ofExecutive Powerfrom
George Washington to George W Bush 7 and Garry Wills's Bomb Power: The Modern
Presidency and the National Security State use similar techniques to support radically
different conclusions about the desirability of strong executive power. Both books are
works of "advocacy history," and both proceed by the technique of selective storytelling,
recounting episodes from our rich constitutional history that support their respective
theses and largely ignoring contrary ones.9
Yoo, who is more Hamiltonian than Hamilton, was a principal legal adviser to the
recent Bush administration. He believes in very broad executive power that can routinely
override statutes in the realms of foreign policy and war. 1 0 His book tries to provide
historical undergirding for his theories by arguing that in times of crisis, strong
presidents have taken independent actions with beneficial effects for the nation. In
general, that is true, but Yoo's account largely leaves out the contributions of Congress
and the courts, perhaps because some of those contributions have limited presidential
power. He also greatly understates the level of uncertainty about and distrust of
7. John Yoo, Crisis and Command: The History of Executive Powerfrom George Washington to George

W. Bush (Kaplan PubIg. 2009).
8.

Garry Wills, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State (Penguin Press

2010).
9. Walter Isaacson, Who Declares War? 159 N. Y. Times BRI (Jan. 24, 2010).
10. See generally Bruff, supran. 4, at 105-108.
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executive power that the framers exhibited and that the tentative nature of Article II of
the Constitution displays.1 1 Nor does he admit that the presidents from the framing
generation (Washington through Monroe) were all usually cautious in both their theories
and practices of executive power. 12 When Yoo's theories became the legal policy of the
Bush administration, the result was the inversion of Jefferson's approach - an executive
that ignored both the legislature and the people in pursuit of its unilateral and secret
Hamiltonian vision.
Garry Wills writes to deplore this vision. His rather "overheated" account agrees
with Yoo that the modem presidency wields broad power in what Wills calls a "National
Security State" marked by secrecy and unilateral action.1 3 He attributes these
developments to the existence of nuclear weapons and the culture of secrecy that grew
up around them. He makes rather too much of this - the cold war would have taken place
even were we armed with only conventional weapons of mass destruction. In any event,
focusing on the nuclear age allows Wills to recount executive abuses of power that
anyone would deplore; for example, the witch hunt against Robert Oppenheimer. He also
has an interesting revisionist account of the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which he stresses
the recklessness of Kennedy administration policy as both a cause of the crisis and a
constraint on Kennedy's options once it began. A more balanced account of the nuclear
age would have stressed some of the ways that Congress has limited presidential
adventuring (admittedly, with only indifferent success) and some of the ways that
executive power has succeeded in protecting the Nation, most importantly in the
containment policy that cornered the Soviets until they collapsed. In the end, Wills has a
litany of laments but no clear prescription for how to repair the damage he perceives.
The fourth book for us to consider explores a more limited aspect of executivecongressional relations. In Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo's, The Unitary
Executive: PresidentialPowerfrom Washington to Bush, 14 the focus is on the extent of

presidential powers to remove and supervise subordinate executive officers and the
validity of congressional efforts to limit these powers. As their title suggests, Calabresi
and Yoo adhere to the "unitary executive" theory, which strives to maximize the
individual political responsibility that the framers placed in the President by ensuring
that presidential control flows down into the heart of the bureaucracy. Calabresi and Yoo
are especially opposed to congressional power to create independent regulatory
commissions with members protected against presidential removal except for cause.15
Thus, they envision a simpler organization chart for the executive branch than the one
I1. Jack Rakove, John Yoo on Why the PresidentIs King, Wash. Post B l, B5 (Jan. 10, 2010).
12. See H. Jefferson Powell, The President'sAuthority over Foreign Affairs: An Essay in Constitutional

Interpretation(Carolina Academic Press 2002).
13. George Perkovich, Not Just a Bigger Weapon: The Atomic Bomb Blasted Away the Constitution's
Checks and Balances, Wash. Post B6 (Feb. 7, 2010).
14. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Powcr from
Washington to Bush (Yale U. Press 2008).

15. For a condensed presentation of their theory, see Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove
Morrison v. Olson, 62 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 103 (2009), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/
my
articles/2009/ Il/Calabresi-Yoo-Remove-Morrison-v.-Olson-62-Vand.-L.-Rev.-En-Banc- 103-2009.pdf;
response is Harold H. Bruff, Bringing the Independent Agencies in from the Cold, 62 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc

63 (2009), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/articles/2009/1 I/Bruff-62-Vand-L-Rev-En-Banc-63.pdf. This
online roundtable is available at www.vanderbilt.edu/lawreview/enbanc/roundtable.
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that exists, with a hierarchical relationship between the President and everyone who
executes the law. This does not mean, however, that they espouse broad inherent
substantive powers for the President, for example, in war making; they do not. Because
their theory is relatively modest in intention, the constitutional stakes are reduced.
The initial hurdle that a unitary executive theory faces is the constitutional text,
which says little about the internal characteristics of the executive branch. After vesting
the "executive power" in "a President," 17 Article 11 charges him to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,"18 presumably by subordinates, from whom he may
demand an "Opinion, in writing"1 9 about their duties. Nothing is said about removal of
officers except for the impeachment clauses, which vest that power in Congress. In
addition, among the powers of Congress is the architectural half of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, authorizing Congress to enact statutes for "carrying into Execution" the
powers assigned to the other two branches.20 Congress has busily employed its
architectural power, creating the agencies and the officers who staff them. It has not
limited presidential removal of the cabinet secretaries, but has often done so for members
of the independent regulatory commissions and for inferior officers and employees of
many kinds. For its part, the Supreme Court says that Congress may limit removal unless
doing so would "impermissibly interfere with" presidential supervision of law
execution. 2 1
Professors Calabresi and Yoo begin by endorsing "departmentalism," the
proposition that each of the three branches may legitimately interpret the Constitution in
the performance of its duties. This is correct - each branch does just that every day. In
fact, all four of the books discussed here display departmentalism in many contexts. The
question is, when the branches disagree, who prevails? For issues related to the unitary
executive, Calabresi and Yoo think the president should win. In the absence of other
textual support, they place great stress on the Vesting Clause as a substantive grant of
power to the President to supervise execution. Calabresi and Yoo know that their
Hamiltonian position is traditionally contested by a Madisonian response that stresses
congressional power over architecture. With the framers a bit at odds on this question,
Calabresi and Yoo offer a solution that is drawn from the behavior of the first forty-three
presidents.
The main project of The Unitary Executive is to show that all of our presidents
have followed the unitary executive theory in the official positions they have taken, with
only minor and soon-regretted exceptions. Herein lies the main contribution of the book,
and it is substantial. Through a painstaking review of statements made by presidents
large and small, Calabresi and Yoo show that presidents have consistently insisted on
their power to remove subordinates. Of course, this is not very surprising because
presidents rarely concede an absence of any power they might need. Calabresi and Yoo
find much less material to offer regarding presidential statements about their power to
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Calabresi & Yoo, supra n. 14, at 411-12.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
Id. at §3.
Id. at §2, cl. 1.
Id. at art. I, cl. 18.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 (1988).
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direct subordinates, in part because presidents simply do that all the time with only
occasional questions arising within the executive about its appropriateness.
There is, however, a departmentalist answer to all this. Congress has insisted on its
own interpretation of presidential powers of removal and direction. Congress presents its
interpretations both informally in oversight of executive actions and formally in bills
presented to the President for signature or veto. The overall outcome of this contest
between the branches has been that presidents have acquiesced in congressional power to
restrict removability of most officers, and Congress has acquiesced in presidential
powers to direct officers for whom it has not restricted removal. This outcome, which
appears to be stable, is not obviously deplorable. Let me explain it in practical terms.
Presidents have routinely signed bills that restrict their removal powers by creating
independent agencies or officers with tenure protections, often protesting the incursion
on their powers as they did so. As Calabresi and Yoo concede, a president usually
concentrates on increasing executive power either generally or for especially favored
matters, and a concession to Congress on a relatively minor issue of removal may
advance that project.22 Once these agencies and officers have been created, it is
generally not in the President's political interest to confront Congress by trying to
remove or supervise them. In fact, one reason so little is known about the law of removal
is that political considerations tend to dominate legal ones. That is, a cabinet member
who has an independent political base may be quite safe from removal; an independent
commissioner who causes a scandal can be informally and successfully pressured to
leave office.23 In general, though, presidents do not actively try to supervise the
independent agencies in ways not supported by such explicit statutory powers as
determining their budgets and designating their chairs. The game is not worth the candle.
For cabinet departments and other nonindependent agencies, the limits of
presidential direction are generally understood to be as follows. First, since Congress
routinely grants authority to administer statutes to these officers, not the President, they
must make the formal decisions. The President is free to direct them to make a particular
decision and, if they resist for legal or policy reasons, to remove and replace them,24 but
the President may not exercise statutory authority granted to these officers himself.
Presidents also issue executive orders that require the agencies to consult with the White
House about the costs and benefits of their proposed regulations; Congress has
acquiesced in these orders. 25
Thus, the power to supervise the executive branch is shared between the President
and Congress in ways that are compromised and are based more on history than on grand
theory. The advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement are known. To a pluralist,
the arrangement is within constitutional limits, its messiness being offset by the benefits

22. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra n. 14, at 172 (discussing Lincoln).
23. For an exploration of these factors, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the UnitaryExecutive Theoryfrom
Those Who Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and
Christopher Yoo, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 593 (2010).
24. Calabresi and Yoo recount the famous story of President Andrew Jackson's removal of Secretary of the
Treasury William Duane as an example of this relationship. Calabresi & Yoo, supra n. 14, at 105-122.
25. Peter M. Shane & Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Law. Cases and Materials 511-539 (2d ed.,
Carolina Academic Press 2005).
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of the creative tension that results from involving both political branches in oversight of
the executive agencies.
Calabresi and Yoo reject the desirability of this power sharing in favor of the
benefits of clean and strong lines of political accountability to the President. Here they
must envision a world that does not currently exist their promised land of a new and
improved federal government. What they do not do, however, is paint any detailed
picture of the altered landscape, of the practical differences they envision if the unitary
executive is endorsed by the Supreme Court. Would newly empowered presidents seize
the reins of power and bring the unwieldy bureaucracy under control? It is quite unclear
that presidents can do much more to control the bureaucracy than they now attempt. The
fact that President Obama felt the need to create various "czars," his own new
bureaucracy to control the bureaucracy, reveals the serious practical limits to
comprehensive control by the President himself.
Disadvantages to a more unitary presidency are easy to imagine. Would a more
politicized bureaucracy return us to the bad old days of the spoils system of the
nineteenth century? Would presidents issue ukases to agencies that far outran their own
command of the law and policy questions involved? In the end, Calabresi and Yoo ask
the reader to take a leap of faith that a unitary executive would be better for the nation
than the existing plural model. I am too skeptical of proposals to reform our giant and
complex bureaucracy to take that leap with them.
Nor can I share the faith of either John Yoo or Garry Wills. The accounts in all
three books are too partial to be persuasive. Even Jeremy Bailey focuses a bit too much
on his protagonist, and not enough on the interplay of Jefferson's assertions of power
with the actions of the other two branches. We need more historical analyses that look at
the contribution of all three branches to our law of presidential power, because all three
have in fact played important roles in developing it. Such an approach can have the
disciplining effect of revealing what our national experience teaches rather than
fortifying the predispositions that we have brought to the inquiry.
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